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Abstract 
This article reviews a particular aspect of the critique of the increasing focus on the brain and neuroscience; 
what has been termed by some,  ?ŶĞƵƌŽŵĂŶŝĂ ? ?/ƚĞŶŐĂŐĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ƚŽƚŚĞ ?ĨŝƌƐƚƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐ ?ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶalliance of child welfare advocates and politicians which draws on 
the authority of neuroscience to argue that social problems such as inequality, poverty, educational 
ƵŶĚĞƌĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ŵĞŶƚĂů ŝůůŶĞƐƐ ĂƌĞ ďĞƐƚ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ?ĞĂƌůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?
programmes to protect or enhance emotional and cognitive aspects ŽĨĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐďƌĂŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ. The 
movement began in the USA in the early 1990s, and has become increasingly vocal and influential since 
then, achieving international legitimacy in the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the UK and 
elsewhere.  
The movement, and the brain-based culture of expert-led parent training which has grown with it, has 
been criticized for claiming scientific authority while taking a cavalier approach to scientific method and 
evidence; for being overly deterministic about the early years of life; for focusing attention on individual 
parental failings rather than societal or structural problems; for adding to the expanding anxieties of 
parents and strengthening the intensification of parenting and ultimately, for redefining the parent-child 
relationship in biologised, instrumental and dehumanized terms.  





In 1989, the United States Congress declared the subsequent ten years to ďĞƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĐĂĚĞŽĨƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶ ?.
The prioritization of the brain has since become a sustained, international phenomenon: Italy, Sweden, 
The Netherlands and Canada announced brain decades soon after the US (Beaulieu 2001, 672) and in 1992 
the European Union (EU) launched an initiative to promote neurobiological research. In 2013, the EU set 
up the  ‘Human Brain Project ? (budget 1.2 billion euros) and the US committed an even larger sum (3 billion 
US dollars) to the  ‘Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies ? (BRAIN) project (Rose 
2013). This commitment to gaining greater scientific knowledge has been welcomed for its potential to 
find explanations and treatments for disorders of the brain, but it has also produced disquiet. Concerns 
have been raised that such a powerful focus on the brain inevŝƚĂďůǇƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶ ‘ŽǀĞƌ-ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ?of how much 
this scientific exploration can tell us about the human condition  and fears of biologised, reductionist and 
deterministic explanations for complex human phenomenon have been voiced. Critics have warned of the 
danger of over-ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ‘ďƌĂŝŶĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ůĞĂĐŚŝŶŐout beyond the laboratory into other areas of social life, such 
as the law and crime prevention, politics and governance, and childcare and education (Satel and Lilienfeld 
2013; Rose and Abi-Rached 2013; Rose and Rose 2012; Tallis 2011; Legrenzi and Umilta 2011; Rose 2010). 
 
The aim of this article is to explore (Tallis 2011; Legrenzi and Umilta 2011): the literature produced in 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽǁŚĂƚdŚŽƌŶƚŽŶ  ? ? ? ? ? )ŚĂƐ ƚĞƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ ƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?. This alliance of child 
welfare advocates and politicians, which became increasingly vocal and influential from the early 1990s, 
has drawn authority from the wider excitement about neuroscience to argue that social problems such as 
inequality, poverty, educational underachievement, violence and mental illness are best addressed 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ĞĂƌůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ Žƌenhance emotional and cognitive aspects of 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ďƌĂŝŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ (Bruer 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a and 1999b; Hulbert 2004; Thornton, 




2011). Such interventions tend to concentrate their efforts on changing the behaviour of parents and 
others involved in caring for children in the years 0 to 3 (or even earlier, during pregnancy and pre-
conception).  
 
Two figures have gained particular prominence for their early response to the promulgation of brain-
based policy: the US academics Jerome Kagan and John Bruer. In 1998, Kagan, a renowned psychologist 
of child development, ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞĞƐƐĂǇ ? ‘dŚĞůůƵƌĞŽĨ/ŶĨĂŶƚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐŵ ? ?ŝŶŚŝƐďŽŽŬThree Seductive 
Ideas. This influential essay historicizes brain claims to demonstrate the long-standing appeal of 
deterministic ideas about the early years of life. In 1999, John Bruer, a philosopher working in the field of 
cognitive neuroscience published his book, The Myth of the First Three Years, which achieved considerable 
public attention and addressed in detail the ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ŽƚŚ<ĂŐĂŶĂŶĚ
Bruer questioned whether the scientific findings on which the brain advocates based their claims were 
actually new (and were therefore justification for a radical new approach to child-rearing) and argued that 
scientific research was being misinterpreted by advocates to draw unjustifiably deterministic conclusions 
about the significance of early childhood experiences on later life. Their work has played an important 
role in stimulating a critical response to the first three years movement and raised many of the critical 
questions which have subsequently been of interest to scholars. They will therefore be referred to 
throughout this paper as we move through the literature produced in their wake. 
 
We can identify three consistent aspects to the critique of the first three years movement from the late 
1990s to the present. The first to be outlined here challenges the scientific basis of the claims about infant 
development vigorously disseminated by advocates of brain-based policy interventions. The second calls 
into question the politicization of parenting and childcare as a solution to what have been more usually 




seen as structurally-generated social problems such as inequality and poverty. The third critically engages 
with the implications of viewing the relationship between child and parent through the prism of nurturing 
the infant brain, in particular, the reconceptualizing of love in biological terms. 
 
Given the multiple dimensions to the questions raised by the  ‘ƉŽƚĞŶƚŶĞƵƌŽďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŵĞŵĞ ? ?tĂƐƚĞůůĂŶĚ
White 2012, 402) expressed within the first three years movement, it is unsurprising that critical literature 
has emanated from scholars across a range of disciplines: sociology, history, psychology and social 
psychology, media and cultural studies, and philosophy, but also neuroscience itself. We can see growing 
interest in this area amongst sociologists from the US, Canada, Australia and the UK, responding to the 
rapid dissemination and take-up of brain claims by their own national governments, and drawing on the 
earlier literature from the US in their analysis. While the challenge to the science of brain claims has 
continued, sociologists, cultural theorists and philosophers are increasingly focusing on the meaning and 
socio-cultural effects of the focus on the brain, often utilizing a Foucauldian framework of discourse 
analysis to contextualize their analysis within ĂĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ ‘ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?.
Rather than discussing the literature by discipline or by theoretical approach, this review will discuss it 
thematically by working through the three aspects outlined above. We begin with the critique of the 
scientific basis of brain claims, move onto attempts to understand the political significance of the early 
years policy focus, and finally we discuss the work of scholars researching the impact of these ideas on 
the norms of child-rearing and the practices of parents. 
 
The critique of the scientific validity of brain claims 




Back in 1999, John Bruer identified and evaluated the three most-repeated claims relating to the brain 
and the early years. While these evidence claims have their origins in the scientific study of brains, these 
have seldom been human brains, as it has been considered ethically problematic to conduct experiments 
on infants (Bruer 1999a; Castaneda 2002). Results have therefore, often been derived from animal 
experimentation, in particular with rats, kittens or monkeys [1]. ƐƌƵĞƌ ?Ɛ analysis has been returned to 
by many scholars since, we will outline it here:  
 
1. ThĞŝŶĨĂŶƚďƌĂŝŶĐĂŶďĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚĂƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŝŶŐĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉůŽƐŝǀĞƐǇŶĂƉƚŝĐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚ
is, brain growth is most dynamic during gestation and during the early years of life. This is interpreted by 
the first three years movement to mean ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇǇĞĂƌƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ ‘ƵƐĞŝƚŽƌůŽƐĞŝƚ ?ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽ
shape infant brains. Many have disputed these claims to truth: arguing that more synapses do not mean 
more brain power; increased dendritic density occurs at any age, and that only certain areas of the brain 
showed increased density during the early years. 
 
2. TŚŝƐ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƐǇŶĂƉƚŝĐ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ Ă  ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? Žƌ  ‘ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ǁŚŝĐŚ
particular aspects of development must be nurtured lest ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚĚĂŵĂŐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
emotional potential occurs. Bruer contends that critical periods are the exception, not the norm in human 
development, that although there seems to be evidence that language acquisition and visual development 
are particularly rooted in the early years, this is atypical of the development of other human faculties.  
 
 ? ? ‘ŶƌŝĐŚĞĚ ?Žƌ ‘ƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ?ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞďĞƚƚĞƌ ŝŶĨĂŶƚďƌĂŝŶƐǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůů ?ŝŶƚƵƌŶ ?ĐƌĞĂƚĞĐůĞǀĞƌĞƌ ?
more emotionally attuned infants children and adults. Bruer argues that human brains develop in 




massively varying but essentially  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?which are sufficient to stimulate brain 
development.  
 
Others, like Bruer, working within the field of neuroscience have identified and challenged some of the 
ŬĞǇ  ‘ŶĞƵƌŽŵǇƚŚƐ ?(Blakemore and Frith 2000; Thompson and Nelson 2001; Tallis 2011). There has also 
been what one neuroscientist calls  ‘ƌƵŵďůŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞũƵŶŐůĞŽĨŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ƐƉĂƚĞŽĨŚŝŐŚ-profile 
papers particularly critical of the methodological shortcomings in neuroimaging studies ? (Bishop 2012).  
 
There is now a large literature critiquing the way in which neuroscience enters the public domain (Jones 
and Zigler 2002; Bangerter and Heath 2004; Poldrack 2006 and 2008; K ?ŽŶŶŽƌ ?ZĞĞƐand Joffe 2012; 
Racine et al. 2010). The disjuncture between the scientific evidence available from neuroscience and the 
claims made in its name has been analysed by scholars concerned with the apparent impact of images of 
fMRI (brain) scans on media reporting and, it is presumed, a wider public. Weisberg et al. (2008) and 
McCabe and Castel (2008) are the most widely cited authors on the subject. Their experiments with 
presenting scientific evidence to a lay public, with and without neuroscience images and vocabulary, seem 
to show that neuroscience enjoys a high level of legitimacy, which adds to the authority of claims made, 
regardless of its scientific relevance to them (Weisberg et al. 2008, 470). Legrenzi and Umilta suggest that, 
When a part of the body acquires particular relevance and comes into the foreground, all the rest 
fades in to the background...In other words, the activity detected by the scanner shows (or, more 
precisely, convinces us that we have seen) something of which we were not aware, that is outside 
the boundaries of our knowledge...(Legrenzi and Umilta 2011, 69) 




dŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌŐƵĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐĂ ‘ǁŽŶĚĞƌĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŝŶŶĞǁŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĐůĂŝŵƐ based in brain science. (Diane M. 
Beck (2010) concludes that the power of brain imaging in the popular press resides in the simplicity of the 
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŝƚĐŽŶǀĞǇƐĂŶĚƚŚĞďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚŝŵĂŐĞƐ ‘ƉƌŽǀĞ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇƚŚŝŶŬĂƌĞ
true (Beck 2010,  ? ? ? ) ?ŽŶŶŽƌƐĂŶĚ^ŝŶŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĨDZ/ŝŵĂŐĞƐŚĂǀĞĂ ‘ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ůĂǇŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞDĞůŽŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐĂǇƐƚŚĞƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ ŽƵƌ ŶĞƵƌŽďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ? ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ Ă ƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĨŽƌ ŵŽƌĂů ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ  ‘ĚĞĞƉůǇ
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƌƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?DĞůŽŶŝ  ? ? ? ?,  ? ? ? ) ?&ŝŶĞ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
neuro-fixing of gender differences highlights the conservative effects of brain claims:  
dŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌ ? ‘KŚ ?ŝƚ ?ƐƚŚĞbrain, ?ŽĨĨĞƌƐĂƚŝĚǇũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽǁŝƚŚĐůear 
conscience. (Fine 2008, 71) 
 
There is a consensus amongst those psychologists and neuroscientists who have criticised the 
interpretation given to neuroscientific findings to justify an early years policy focus, that too much 
deterministic power is attributed to the early years. They argue, that in fact, longer childhood experiences 
are just as, if not more, significant than those of infancy, and neurological development continues into, 
and throughout, adulthood. Brain development is therefore better described as plastic and resilient rather 
than determined or fixed. In his Presidential Address to the Society for Research on Child Development, 
Michael Rutter, while acknowledging the real advances in scientific understanding of the brain emerging 
frŽŵŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĞǀĂŶŐĞůŝƐŵ ?which was giving ƌŝƐĞ ƚŽ  ‘ƉŽůĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ
ďĂƚƚůĞƐĂŶĚĂďƐƵƌĚĐůĂŝŵƐ ?about the role of the early years in determining brain development (Rutter 
2002, 1). ZƵƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛown research with children raised in the extreme deprivation of Romanian orphanages, 
has often been misused by brain policy advocates to support the idea of critical periods of development 




and to argue for the need for enriched environments for children, despite Rutter ?Ɛ much more open 
interpretation of the influence of the early years. Jerome Kagan concurs with ZƵƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶclusion that: 
The ill effects of early traumata are by no means inevitable or irrevocable...the evidence runs 
strongly counter to views that early experiences irrevocably change personal development. 
(Rutter, 1987 cited in Kagan 1998, 112)  
 
These criticisms from within science suggest that brain-policy advocates have a tendency to depict a false 
consensus amongst scientists, to misrepresent or misinterpret the findings of scientific research and are 
unfamiliar with the caution and questioning characteristic of the scientific method. Raymond Tallis (2011) 
ĚƌĂǁƐĂƵƐĞĨƵůĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĂŶĚ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐŵ ?ĂƐ an ideological phenomenon 
in which the authority of science is drawn upon by those outside the field. John Bruer (1999a) and the 
historian Ann Hulbert (2004) point out that even ĂƚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚůŝŶƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?tŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ‘ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ
ƚŚĞ ƌĂŝŶ ?, a pivotal moment in the development of the first three years movement, just two brain 
scientists were present, and both of these made far more modest claims than the campaigners and brain 
intervention advocates. 
Within the critical analysis of the cultural significance of neuroscientific claims-making, there is a focus on 
ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĂďŝĞƐ ? ďƌĂŝŶƐ ? ƚƌŽƉĞ ? ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ďǇ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐdŚŽŵƉƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ EĞůƐŽŶ
(2001) of media coverage of early brain development concludes that the media tend to exaggerate the 
extent of knowledge about the developing brain; inflate the importance of the first three years by not 
acknowledging the life-long nature of brain development; and overemphasize the developmental 
significance of parental care relative to other influences. Social psychologists O ?ŽŶŶŽƌĂŶĚ:ŽĨĨĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ
ƚŚĂƚďƌĂŝŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶ ‘ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉŽŝŶƚŝŶĐŚŝůĚ-ƌĞĂƌŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƵƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ
ƚŚĞ “ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ?K ?ŽŶŶŽƌĂŶĚ:ŽĨĨĞ 2012, 221). We will return to this in the third 








Despite the attempt by neuroscientists and psychologists to challenge the certainty of brain claims, they 
have continued to be disseminated, relatively unchanged, by energetic advocates of brain-based 
ƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞ  ‘/ĂŵǇŽƵƌĐŚŝůĚ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ, launched at the 1997 White House 
Conference by the film director Rob Reiner, achieved international reach with its celebrity-endorsed and 
corporate-funded, brain-advocacy ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŶĚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽdŚŽŵƉƐŽŶĂŶĚEĞůƐŽŶ ?  ‘ĐƌǇƐƚĂůůŝǌĞĚƚŚĞ
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐŽĨĞĂƌůǇďƌĂŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). Canadian sociologist Glenda Wall 
descriďĞƐŚŽǁ ‘/ĂŵǇŽƵƌĐŚŝůĚ ?was heavily promoted by the Canadian Institute of Child Health (Wall 2004, 
42) while Wilson reported successful lobbying for the campaign in New Zealand (Wilson 2002). More 
recently, academics have noticed the incorporation of the same brain-based policy ideas into UK family 
policy, most explicitly since the election of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government in 
2010 (Wastell and White 2012; Edwards, Gillies and Horsley 2013), but actually from the early 2000s, 
when New Labour was in government (Macvarish 2014). Below we can see the front covers of two reports 
produced for the UK government, making the case for early intervention on brain-based grounds. 









/Ŷ  ‘dŚĞ ůůƵƌĞ ŽĨ /ŶĨĂŶƚ ĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐŵ ? ? <ĂŐĂŶ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉĞĂů ŽĨ ďƌĂŝŶ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
politicians lies in the fact that they serve to avoid moralising parental behaviour and therefore divert 
attention from the reality of an absence of consensus about what is right and wrong in family life, or about 
the legitimate role of the state in raising children.  ‘'ŽŽĚƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐĂ
commitment to the improvement of knowledge and skills by engaging with expert knowledge (see also 
Smeyers 2008 and 2010). <ĂŐĂŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƚŚƵƐ ? ‘ ? ? ?ƉŽŽƌŵŽƚŚĞƌƐůŽǀĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ďƵƚ
ĚŽŶŽƚŬŶŽǁƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐĨĂĐƚƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?<ĂŐĂŶ ? ?  , 90). 
 




Despite their apparently morally neutral appearance, Gillies (2013) argues that brain interventions are in 
fact, deeply moralising and establish new norms and standards, in particular, with their demands for 
intensive maternal interaction with the baby and even the fetus. They construct as biologically necessary, 
a lifestyle which is, in reality, only realistic for a small number of better-off mothers with the inclination 
to devote all their time to baby-care. It is reported that brain-based training programmes for professionals 
are now being rolled out nationally in health, social care and education services (Gillies 2013; Edwards, 
Gillies and Horsley 2013). Brain-based predictions of long-term harm to babies from negative early 
experiences are also informing decision-making by child protection services, with the result that more 
babies are being removed from their parents on pre-emptive, harm prevention grounds (Wastell and 
White 2012; Featherstone, Morris and White 2013). Here we can see the harsh consequences of brain-
based determinism when it informs the judgements of those with the power to judge parents and remove 
children from their care. 
 
Writing from the American experience, Hulbert also highlights the negative implications of brain-based 
ĞĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ PŝŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨďƌĂŝŶĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ?ůŝďĞƌĂůƐŽĐŝĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂĨŽƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƐŽĐial interventions, the 
flipside, she argues, has been a profound fatalism and pessimism. 
If young brains subjected to deprived conditions, and to the inadequate parenting that often goes 
along with them, are irrevocably damaged  W pickled in stress hormones, stripped of synapses  W 
there is no time to waste, that is true. Yet such alarm, though it conveys urgency, can all too easily 
fuel defeatism. If children become neurologically unresilient at an early age, then only intrusive 
and intensive remedial efforts seem equal to the job. And if  W Žƌ ? ůĞƚ ?Ɛ ĨĂĐĞ ŝƚ ? ǁŚĞŶ  W such 
intervention fails to materialize, the case for subsequent help is ďŽƵŶĚƚŽƐĞĞŵǁĞĂŬĞƌ ? ? ?,ƵůďĞƌƚ 
2004, 316) 




The brain claims, she argues, 
...consigned the child, as much as genetic determinism ever had, to a fate shaped decisively by 
her parentage, thus depriving her of more than baby talk. She was denied a resourceful role in 
helping to shape a future that was still unfolding long past the age of three, influenced by forces 
well beyond simpůǇŚĞƌƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ (Hulbert 2004, 316) 
 
Although brain claims have been most consistently criticised for their determinism, a more recent aspect 
of the literature attempts to critique brain-based thinking more theoretically, as a reflection of 
 ‘ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?tĂůůĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂƐƉůĂĐŝŶŐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƚŽ
adapt to change, to engage in self-enhancing behaviour, and to manage the risk they pose to themselves 
and thus reduce their potential burden ŽŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?tĂůů2004, 46). Others have associated the arguments 
for brain-ďĂƐĞĚĞĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĐƵƚǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŽ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝǌĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĂŝƐŝŶŐ
of children solely to parents, in particular, mothers (Gillies 2013). This view cŽŶĐƵƌƐ ǁŝƚŚ tĂůů ?Ɛ
assessment that: 
The focus on educating parents fits well with a model of individual responsibility and privatized 
parenting. It does not require governments to re-invest in the welfare state and design policy to 
alleviate poverty, provide affordable housing and child care services, and improve employment 
practices. (Wall 2004, 47)  
Thornton understands brain-ďĂƐĞĚƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂƐĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇĂ ‘ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů ?ŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŽ ‘ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ
entrepreneurial forms of self-governance by producing babies emotionally primed to navigate an 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞƐĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ?ŵŽďŝůĞ ?ĂŶĚĂĚƉƚĂďůĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?(Thornton 2011, 400). 
 




Nadesan takes a similar view but raises questions about the wider and deeper significance of the appeal 
of neuroscientific explanations. She explores in greater depth than most others, the political significance 
of neuroscience to the contemporary period, and in particular, to new constructions of personhood. She 
points to the authoritarian aspects of brain-based policy when applied to those at the bottom of society: 
...brain science legitimizes more formal surveillance of, and intervention in, infant development, 
particularly the development of economically disadvantaged children. (Nadesan 2002, 424)  
But also describes bƌĂŝŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐǁŝĚĞƌŝŵƉĂĐƚĂĐƌŽƐƐwider society:  
In addition to functioning as a tool of social engineering for the poor, brain science, as popularized 
by the US media, also functions as a form of corporate colonization among the middle classes 
through its implicit promises to engineer middle-ĐůĂƐƐ ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ? ĂŶǆŝĞƚǇ ďǇ ŚŽůĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞĨŽƌĞĂĐŚĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇƐƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶĨĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚĨŽƌĞǀĞƌǇĨƵƚƵƌĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ
and failure. (Nadesan 2002, 424) 
 
Contextualising brain claims within contemporary parenting culture 
Social scientists have begun to analyse the way in which brain-focused conceptualisations of the child 
interact with the broader culture of contemporary parenting norms (Hays 1996; Furedi 2001; Nadesan 
2002; Wall 2004 and Wall 2010; Romagnoli and Wall 2012; Lupton 2011). The construction of ďĂďŝĞƐ ?
brains as extremely susceptible to benign and malign influences can be seen as a biologised concentration 
of pre-existing idea of infant vulnerability, discussed at length by British sociologist Frank Furedi in his 
book Paranoid Parenting (2001). Furedi and the American sociologist Sharon Hays (1998) identify the idea 
ŽĨ ŝŶĨĂŶƚǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ? P ŝĨƚŚĞ ŝŶĨĂnt body and brain is 
ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŽĨĂƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇ  ‘Ăƚ-ƌŝƐŬ ? ? ƚŚĞŶthe task of parenting becomes one fraught with anxiety and 
problems. From Australia, Deborah LƵƉƚŽŶŚĂƐĂůƐŽǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞůǇĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚ




should be a protected world and that children can only survive and develop successfully if intensely 
nurtured and protected by adults ? (Lupton 2011, 638).  
 
>ƵƉƚŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŝƚŚƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶŵŽƚŚĞƌƐĨŝŶĚƐƚŚĂƚŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶĨĂŶƚďƌĂŝŶ have become 
incorporated into contemporary norms of maternal responsibility: 
As well as discussing strategies for promoting good health in their infants, the mothers talked 
about the importance of helping their children develop normally. They mentioned such strategies 
as exposing their ďĂďŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ
encourage optimal intellectual and physical development. (Lupton 2011, 646) 
Canadian sociologist Glenda Wall has also found evidence that mothers in particular are receptive to the 
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞŝƐƚŽƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐďƌĂŝŶƐĨƌŽŵĂǇŽƵŶŐĂŐĞ ?According to Wall, 
this is not surprising, given that: 
Throughout the 1990s, claims about the potential of early education and appropriate stimulation 
to enhance brain capacity in children have gained a new and prominent place in child rearing 
advice literature and discourse. These changes in the social understandings of infant and child 
development have significant implications for mothers, with whom the majority of responsibility 
for child outcomes is placed. (Wall 2004, 41) 
Not only is the born infant an object of concern, but it has been observed that the requirements of 
intensive parenthood are freqƵĞŶƚůǇ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚs ?ŝŶƚŽƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƉƌĞ-conception (Lee 
et al. 2014). Wolf also locates a concern for the neurobiological within a broader context of intensive 
ƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƉƌĞŶĂƚĂůƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐĂŶĚ ‘ĨĞƚĂůƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵŝŶŐ ? ?tŽůĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? A significant feature of 
ƚŚĞ ďƌĂŝŶ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŵĞĚŝĂ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞĂƌůǇ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ ďǇ
K ?ŽŶŶŽƌĂŶĚ:ŽĨĨĞ ?ƐǁĂƐŚŽǁ: 




 ?diverse phenomena, ranging from psychiatric disorders and obesity to alcoholism, romantic 
success and sexual orientation, were presented as direct consequences of prenatal events 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĨĞƚĂůďƌĂŝŶ ? ?K ?ŽŶŶŽƌĂŶĚ:ŽĨĨĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ).  
 
Lachlan Story, a sociologist of reproductive science and medicine, argues that in the  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĨĞƚĂů
stimulation ?ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇĂŶĚĞĂƌůǇĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚĂĚǀŝĐĞďŽŽŬƐ, and marketing material for products 
designed to stimulate the fetus, we can see that ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨĞƚƵƐ ŝƐ ŝŶĨĂŶƚŝůŝǌĞĚ ? ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ ůĞĂƌŶ ĂŶĚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŝƚƐ ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĨĂŶƚŝƐĨĞƚĂůŝƐĞd ?ŝŶŝƚƐŝŶƚĞŶƐĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ (Story 2003, 47). US 
sociologist Victoria Pitts-dĂǇůŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐŚŽǁƚŚĞĨĞƚĂůďƌĂŝŶŚĂƐĞǀĞŶďĞĞŶƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ƐƚĂǀĞŽĨĨ ?
dementia at the end of life, with mothers recommended to eat diets rich in folates, expose the fetus to 
ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ŵƵƐŝĐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ĚĞǀŽƚĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŶĂů ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďƵŵƉ ? ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ŽƉƚŝŵĂů ďƌĂŝŶ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ
throughout life (2010, 645). 
 
We can see from the descriptions above, that the norms of parenting which emerge from a culture 
ĂƚƚƵŶĞĚƚŽ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĂǀĞĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƌĞŶƚƐƚŽŶĞǁůĞǀĞůƐ ?
The disconcerting effects of the relentless reporting of new risks to the body and brain of the child have 
been discussed by academics such as Furedi (2001), Lee et al. (2014) and Lupton (2011). It has also been 
observed that claims to new brain knowledge do not simply make novel demands for parents to  ‘ƐŬŝůůƵƉ ?,
but they may also redefine previously held,  ‘commonsense ?, understandings of parenting (Thompson and 
Nelson 2001; Wilson 2002; Yaqub 2002). The UK campaign Five to Thrive, (see website below), urges 
ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐƚŽĂƚƚƵŶĞƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌďĂďǇ ?ƐďƌĂŝŶƐďǇ ‘talking, playing, relaxing, 
cuddling and responding ?. dŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ƐůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƚƌĂŝŶŝng programmes, currently being purchased 
by various local councils, illustrates the reconceptualization of everyday parent-child interactions as 




having special brain significance. According to &ŝǀĞ ƚŽdŚƌŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐ  ‘ƌĞůĂǆŝŶŐ ?




While Wall and Lupton emphasise the imperative for mothers to maximize the intellectual capacities of 
ƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐƚǇůĞƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŽĨĐĂƌĞ ?dŚŽƌŶƚŽŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĂƐŚŝĨƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ
ƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĨƌŽŵthe late 1990s, away from ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐĐĂŶďĞ
enhanced by brain-stimulating parenting techniques and towards the argument that a brain-sensitive way 
of parenting is vital for ordinary emotional development. Thornton labels new phenomenon, thĞ ‘ďĂĐŬƚŽ
ďĂƐŝĐƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?, because it criticises as anxiety-inducing and consumerist, the earlier emphasis of the 




first three years movement on intelligence, and calls for a more  ‘ďĂƐŝĐ ? ?emotional focus for everyday 
practices of brain-informed care (Thornton 2011, 401). The same author makes the important point that 
this shift towards the emotions places even greater pressure on intense maternal involvement: mothers 
cannot simply buy DVDs or play classical music to their children, they must commit themselves to true 
emotional attunement with the infant. This cannot be bought or pretended  W it must be authentically felt.  
 
As discussed at the beginning, the similarities between the contemporary biologisation of maternal love 
ĂƐĂ ‘ƚĂŶŐŝďůĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƚŚĂƚŚĂƐĂĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂďůĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŶĞƵƌŽďŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?K ?ŽŶŶŽƌĂŶĚ:ŽĨĨĞ ? ? ? ? ?
6) and attachment theory, were recognised early on by Jerome Kagan (for an earlier critique of attachment 
theory, see Eyer 1992). Reflecting the diverse academic concern with brain-based parenting culture, and 
ĞĐŚŽŝŶŐ<ĂŐĂŶ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚŶĞƵƌŽƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ
ŽĨĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ZĂŵĂĞŬĞƌƐĂŶĚ^ƵŝƐƐĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶĞƵƌŽƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞƐƵƐƚŚĂƚŶĞǁ
 ‘ƌĞĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ŶŽǁĐonfirms and strengthens pre-existing psychological theories about the parent child 
relationship (Ramaekers and Suissa 2012, 20). 
 
TŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƌĞŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ ŵŽƌĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ďǇ
Thornton (2011) and Faircloth (2013 and 2014). However, Thornton highlights an important difference 
between the attachment theory of the 1950s and brain based theories of today: whereas Bowlby posited 
that attachment was a natural instinct in all babies and most mothers, given the right conditions, and 
ůĂƚĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ?ƐďŝŽůŽŐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚďŽŶĚŝŶŐǁĂƐĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇŚŽƌŵŽŶĞƐ ? ƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ
neuroscientific-based theories see attachment as a much less natural or reliable occurrence. Instead, says 
Thornton, bonding is  ‘a technical problem that must be achieved through constant work on the self, 
primarily through actions directed inward; towards feelings, attitudes, and desires ? (Thornton 2011, 409). 
Faircloth (2014) also identifies a distinction between the medicalization of motherhood and maternal love 




in particular in the early twentieth century (Kanieski 2010; Apple 2006), which produced a concern to 
identify particularly dysfunctional mothers, and the contemporary concern to ensure attachment as a 
necessary protective factor for all children. 
 
We can see here that the apparent biologizĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐŝƐŶŽƚƉĂƌĂůůĞůĞĚŝŶĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ Ă ƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŵĞĞƚ ƚŚĞŵ ?This lack of faith in parenting (motherhood) as instinctual is also 
identified by Story (2003). Although ideas about stimulating or communicating with a fetus have a long 
history, Story argues that there is a new, intensified focus on the psychophysical health of the fetus in 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐďŽĚǇŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂƐĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌƚŽĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂtion (Story 2003). The mother can even 
be potentially harmful if her emotional state transfers too much stress to the fetus (Story 2003, 42). 
Nature is therefore not functional, but must be nurtured through the encouragement of particular 
practices (such as those promoted by Five to Thrive) by the use of particular products or through accepting 
the guidance of experts.  
 
Conclusion 
In this review we have analysed three dimensions of the critique of the first three years movement: the 
scientific challenge to the evidence-base of brain claims; the appropriation of neuroscience by politicians, 
child welfare advocates and policy-makers, and the attempt to theorise brain-centred thinking about 
children and parents within a broader context of parenting culture and twentieth-century capitalism. 
More research needs to be done to find out how these new ways of conceptualising parenthood interact, 
at the individual level in particular, with older ideas about family and child-rearing.  
A new area of scholarly interest is an attempt to understand exactly how much reach brain claims have 
into ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ (Dumit 2004; K ?ŽŶŶŽƌĂŶĚ:ŽĨĨĞ  ? ? ? ? ?^ŝŶŐŚ  ? ? ? ? ).




Pickersgill et al. (2011) suggest that people still think there is more to subjectivity than just the brain and 
are resistant to the idea of biological determinism rooted in ƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞĂƚ ?ŽĨŐƌĞǇŵĂƚƚĞƌ (Pickersgill et al. 
2011, 353). They suggest that: 
 ?ideas about neuroscience will continue to be translated into, and intermingle and evolve with, 
longstanding ideas about self and society, and thus develop further societal meaning and personal 
salience. (Pickersgill et al. 2011, 362) 
The studies discussed above point towards the possibility that brain claims have a greater capacity to 
convince when it comes to children, perhaps because, as Kagan says, they interact with pre-existing ideas 
of infant determinism. Kagan argued that in times of rapid social change, infant determinism provides a 
reassuring reinforcement of the belief in a connectedness between past and present (Kagan 1998). 
Historians have also pointed to continuities between the current appeal of neuroscience and the late 
nineteenth century concern for child-rearing, in particular, anxieties about motherly instincts, (Hulbert, 
2004; Hays 1996; Apple 2006; Stearns 2003) and a focus on cultivating the child as the pathway to a better 
future (Lee 2014; Hardyment 2007; Ehrenreich and English 1979; Kessen 1979; Hendrick 1997). As the 
 ‘ĨŝƌƐƚƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚŽǁƐŶŽƐŝŐŶŽĨƐůŽǁŝŶŐĚŽǁŶ ?ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶŝƐ
a pressing one. This review has aimed to introduce interested scholars to a dynamic field of inquiry which 
is bringing together insights from an impressive range of disciplines.  
ENDNOTES 
[1] Although, more recently there seems to be an increasing number of studies reporting on research 
conducted on babies, children and teenagers using fMRI and other technology. It would be interesting to 
know whether thinking around ethical constraints has changed. 
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